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This paper considers two-player normal form games where each player can send a payo(f-irrclevant message prior to play.
Let G be the game whhout communicahon, and G'(M) Ihe extendcd gamc with message set M. Any convex cumbination
of Nash outcomts in G can be approximated in a subgame perfect eyuilibnum uf G'(MI tor wme .bl. Furthermore, every
symmetric gamc has a symmetric subgame perftct communitation eyuilibrium that is undominated in a Iimit sense a) lhe
message xt is enlarged-
1. Introduction
It is otten informally suggested that if the players of a game can communicate, then :he
appropriate equilibrium notion should be not Nash equilibrium, but the larger class uf correlated
equilibria. [See references as early as Luce and Raiffa (1957) or as late as van Damme (1987).] The
assumption is commonplace in discussions of bargaining.
The idea is that if agents can talk, they could reach a self-enforcing agreement to let their
actions be jointly conditioned on the outcome of a stochastic trial, rather than independently as
assumed by the Nash construction. The latter possibility, as formalized by Aumann (1987), expands
the set of possible outcomes to include, in particular, the convex hull of Nash outcomes of the
underlying game. In some cases, outcomes outside the convex hufl are possible.
Aumann's notion of correlated equilibrium is not built on an explicit model of verbal communi-
cation, however. I[ is a much more general attempt to derive an equilibrium concept frum Bayesian
foundations. That is, games are viewed as standard decision-theoretic problems, where each player
is assumed to act raeionally given his partition of the set of states of the world, where the
description of a state of the worfd includes a specification of the strategies played in it. As noted by
Lipman and Srivastava (1990), the definition of correlated equilibrium is silent on the subject of
where this information partition comes from. Lipman and Srivastava study the equilibria attainable
when agents acquire information through costly computa[ion. The present paper considers corre-
lated equilibria that arise in two-player games when information about the strategies to be played is
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A. Wiirru~n.rf ,. Cnmmlurn rulan, rnrrrluuorl, wld spmmrrn- In hrrr~aurun~
endcigcnuusly gcncratcd thruugh 'chcap talk', i.c., cxplicitly modclcd payuff-irrclcvant prc-play
communication.
Thc chcap talk dcvicc was introduccd to cconomics by Crawford and Suhcl ( lyli~) (but prcviou~l~
sugge~ted by thc philotiophcr David Lewis (19(i9)] in the context of gamcs af onc-sided incompletc
Infurmation. Che~p talk is intended as an explicit model of vcrbal communication. Reccntlv thc
gcncral idca, with the strong additional assumption that the costless messages have natural
mcanings in somc language shared by the players, has becn applicd by, e.g., Farrcll (1987) (to
complete information games). Myerson (1989) and Rabin (19UU). Kim and Sobel (1990), Matsui
(1991), and Wiirneryd (199U select equilibria in two-player cheap talk games of complete informa-
tion by applying criteria of evolutionary stabílity. W~rneryd (1990) docs the same for a class of
games of incomplete information. The main purpose of these contributions is to argue that only
eyuilihria efficient within the se[ of equilibria are plausible under communication.
In contrasL one purpose of this paper is to show how the larger set of correlated equilibria can
arisc in cheap talk gamcs with complctc infurmation. It thus providcs somc support for thc
intuition that communication and corrclated equilibrium are related. The fundamental result, that
any convex cumbination such that the weights are rational numbers of two equilibríum outcomes of
the game without communication can be achieved as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the
game with communicatíon, is proved in section 2. The method of proof is very simple. It appears
indirectly in Kim and Sobel (1990). Apart from the cheap talk literature mentioned earlier, which is
concerned not so much with characterizing the set of equilibria under communication as refining it,
there are somc related contributions. De Groote (1990) proves a similar, but weaker result for
games with one-sided communication and moral hazard. For a very general discussion of communi-
cation mechanisms and correlated equilibria, see Forges (1986).
The possibility of correlation is most interesting in bargaining-líke situations where the parties
order the equilibria differently. This paper shows that cheap talk can be effective in situations of
partial conflict of interests. However, symmetric games do not necessarily have symmetric undomi-
nated communication-correlated equilibria. Section 3, the main contribution of this paper, shows
how outcomes which are undominated in the convex hull of Nash outcomes of the underlying game
can be implemented as the Iimit outcome of a sequence of symmetric subgame perfect communica-
tion equilibria where the number of available messages tends toward infinity. The `Battle of the
Sexes' is used as an example.
Finally, section 4 remarks on some weaknesses of the approach.
2. Correlation
Let G be a two-player normal form game with mixed strategy sets St and SZ, which contain as
degenerate cases thc finitely many pure strategies of G. Then S:- SI x S; is the set of strategy
profiles of G. For s e S, rr,(s) is the expected payoff of player i. Write ;r -(r, t, ~rrZ). Let N(G) c S
be the set of Nash equilibrium profilcs of G.
Now extend G by allowing the players to simultaneously send one message each from the finíte
set M prior to playing G. A message set is uniquely identified by its cardinaliry, I M I- Call this
extended game G'(M). A(behavioral) strategy for player i for G'(rN) is a probability distribution
K, over M and a function o,. : M x M y S,, which yields a probability distribution over strategies of
G conditional on the information sets possibly reached after the communication stage. Write
o.-(v„o2). The communication game involves cheap talk in the sense that payoffs a'(a) of
G'(A1) are assumed to depend only on the actions taken in the G subgame.
1~. t4'urnrryd ~ Cummun~c~uun, currrlwion. ~nd .i~~mmrtn' ui burgau~u~x '97
We note that in an equilibrium of G`(.M) the lucal stratcgies playcd at any informatiun sct
reached with positive probabiliry after communicatiun constitutc an cquilibrium of G. For assume
one of the players plans to play a local strategy that is not a best reply to the other player's Iocal
strategy at some information set that is reached with positive probability. Then the first player
could increase his expected payoff by changing to a local best reply at that information set, while
leaving his probabiliry distribution over messages unaltered.
It follows that no equilibrium of G`(M) gives the playcrs expected payoffs outside the convex
hull uf Nash outcumes of G. For this to happen, of course, the profile would have to specify the
play of local strategies that are not an equilibrium of G at wme information set reached with
positive probability.
This property is the main feature that sets correlated eyuilibria under chcap talk apart frum the
general concept of Aumann (1987). !n Aumann's eonception, the pussibility of uutcomes outside
the convex hull of equilibria of the underlying game arlses bCCaUSC [hC players may nut be able tu
observe the state of the world directly, merely the suggested play of a third party ur medi~tor.
We now turn to the first main result, which shows that given a large enuugh message set, any
outcome in the convex hull of equilibria of G may be approximated by a subgame perfect
equilibrium of G'(M).
Proposition 1. Let s' and s" be equilibria of G. Then jor any rationu! number S E(0, U, there
exisrs a message set M such rhat there is a subgame perfect eyuilibrium of G' (MI with e.rpected payoff
S,r(s'1 t (1 - S1,r(s").
Proof. Here is a constructive proof. Let k and m be pusitive integers such that k~m - S. Pick M
such that I M I- m. Note that there is an infinity of pairs (k, m) such that k~in - S, and therefure
an infiniry of inessage sets that will allow the required equilibrium. Now recursively let
s`
s"
o(m~' m,) - a(m,-I~ m~)
a~m~-I~ m~-I)
for i~ 1 and j - 1,...,k,
for i-1 and j-kfl,...,n~,
for i~ l and j- 1,
otherwise,
and let p,l(m) - p.Z(m) - l~m for all m e M. To see that this is an eyuilibnum uf G'(,til 1, cunsidcr
the choice of Player l given that Player 2 complies with the profile. Fur any m, E M that Player I
sends with positive probabiliry, we must have that Q,(m„ mJ)EB~(o,(m„ m~)) for j- I,...,in,
where BI(s,), s. E SZ, is the best reply set for Player l in G against s,. Otherwise Playcr 1 could
increase his expected payoff without altering the probability of sending m,. The proposed profile is
rational in this sense. Furthermore, given that this condition must hold, Player I is indifferent
between probability distributions over M, since for any two messages he sends with positive
probabiliry, his expected payoff given one message is the same as his expected payuff given the
other and equal to (k~m)~rrl(s`)t((m-k)~m)rri(s"). Similar reasoning shows that the pro-
posed scheme involves a best reply of G`(M) for Player 2. The equilibrium is subgame perfect
since every message is sent with positive probability and only equilibria of G are played at each
information set after communication. Finally, note that the expected payoff of this equilibrium is
equal to Sa(s`) t(I -S)~rr(s"), as required. O
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In symmetric games it is often [hought theuretically desirable not only to find noncooperative
solutions that allow coordination, but symmetric ones. If identical agents face identical situations,
we do not want a solution to require some arbitrary distinction between them. Farrell (19R7)
suggests that cheap talk can help. He considers a variant of the simple 'Battle of the Sexes', where
two identical firms contemplate entering a market or not, and both would pre(er that one enters
and the othcr stays ouL This is likc a simple bargaining gamc under completc information. Many
economic models have this kind of natural symmetry. However, in symmetric games, the equilibria
constructed in the previous section do nut necessarily involve symmetrie strategies, where symmetry
is taken to mean that one player plans to play at the information set (m', m") what the other plans
to play at (m", m'), fur all m',m" e M, and both have the same distribution over the message set.
On the other hand, Farrell's proposal, although symmetric, dces not yield an outcome undominated
in the cunvex hull of Nash outcomes. The purpose of this section is to show how cheap talk allows
undominated equilibrium outcomes to be implemented by symmetric strategies.
Consider the simplification of Farrell's model given in table 1. This game has three equilibria
withuut communication, two asymmetric ones in pure strategies, (In, Out) and (Out, In), and one
symmetric in mixed strategies. Let Q denote the symmetric equilibrium. It gives each player an
expected payofF of 2~3.
Now extend the game with cheap talk. Let I M I- 3. We clearly have a symmetric subgame
perfect equilibrium if y i(m) -~tZ(m) - 1~3 for all rn E M and the players' responses at informa-
tiun sets reached with positive probability after communication are as given by table 2. In
cquilibrium each player gets an expected payoff of 11~9, which is an improvement over the
symmetric eyuilibrium in the absence of communication.
Adding twu messages, so that I M I- 5, admits the equilibrium given by table 3. with ~ct(m) -
p:(,rt )- I.5 for all m e M. The expected payoff of both players is now J~3. The process can clearly
be continued, adding two messages at a time to the message set and arranging the responses at











mr Q In. Out Out, In
m, Out.ln Q In.Out
m~ In, Out Out, fn Q
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Table 3
Player 2
mi m, m~ m~ m5
Playcr 1 mt Q In, Out Out, In In. Out Out. In
mi Out, In Q In. Out Out, In In. Out
m~ In, Out Out, In Q In. Out Out, In
m~ Out, In In, Out Out, In Q In, Out
ms In, Ow Out, In In. Out Out. In Q
converge to 1;, which corresponds to an equal probabiliry of ending up in either of the twu
asymmetric equilibria of G, avoiding realization of the diagonals of G entirely.
3.2. Limit unduminated communication equilibria
We now generalize the idea of section 3.1.
Defurition 1. A game is said to be symmetric if St - SZ ~ S and ~rrt(s', s") - rr,(s", s') for all s',
S" E S.
[f s~(s', s"), define s-( s", s'), the symmetric image of a strategy profile s. We note that in a
symmetric game, if s is an equilibrium, then so is f.
Definition 2. A game G is said to have a limit undominated communication equilibrium (LUCE)
with payoff .rr" if there exists a sequence of inessage sets M" such that I M" ~-~ x and subgame
perfect equilibria o"' of G'(M„) such that .rr'(o' ) ~-rr' `, and rr" is undominated in the
convex hull of equilibrium outcomes of G.
Note that, in perhaps a stight abuse of terminology, LUCE does not refer to a particular strategy
profile, but the limit of a sequence of strategy profiles.
From Proposition 1 we immediately realize that every game has a LUCE. However, as noted
above, Proposition 1 does not guarantee that these are implementable by symmetric strategies in
symmetric games.
Proposition 2. Eeery symmetric game has a symmetric LUCE.
Proof. To prove this, let G be a symmetric game. Let s' E N(G) be such that ;(7r,(s') t rr,(s")) ?
;(-rr,(s) t a,(s)), for all s E N(G) and i E(1, 21. That is, s` is an eyuilibrium such that the
arithmetic average of it and its symmetric image's payoffs is undominated among such averages.
Such an equilibrium trivially exists. Let q E N(G) be a symmetric equilibrium. We know that every
symmetric game has one [Nash (1950)]. We may have that q- s' - s'. Now let ~ M I- m, with
m z 3 and m an odd number, and let
q for i-j-1,
s' for i - 1 and I G j ~ m and j even,
v( rn,, rn~ )- s' for i- 1 and l G j 5 m and j odd,
rr(m,-t, m~) for i~ 1 and j- 1,
Q(m,-t, m,-t) otherwise,
t110 I~~. Ilrirnrn~d ~(~rrrrrnuum urrrut. currrlannn, und iYnunr~rrv tn hurqt,rnnt~;
and Ict ~i(rn) -~.:(m) - I~in for all rn ~ L). Fulluwing thc samc rcasoning as in thc prcviuus
pruof, it is casy to scc that this is a symmetric subgame perfect cyuilibrium of G~`(,4f). Now
cun~ider a sequence of such equilibria for in odd and appruaching infinity. The expected payuff
thcn approaches : rr(s' ) t;r,(s~` ), which by construction is undominatcd in thc convcx hull of
Nash outcomes oF G. O.
J. Remarks
To summarizc briefly, correlated eyuilibria have bcen shown to bc Nash eyuilibria of a gamc
extendcd with cheap talk. In particular, communication in this form allows every symmetric game to
have a symmetric equilibrium whose payuff approaches a payoff undominated in the convex hull of
Nash outcomes as thc message set grows large.
The functiun of the communicatiun round in this model is tu generate a space of distinct
information sets that actions can be made contjngent on. Mcssage combinatjons thus play the role
of a publicly observable stuchastic event. It could be noted that a large message set can be replaced
by a smaller set and more than one round of communication. The present model is isomorphic to
some much mudels, although not, for instance, to the one propused by Farrell (1987), where the
additiun of more rounds does not make payoffs converge to an undominated solution.
An immediate problem with this approach is the use of Nash equilibrium as the solution concept
for the communication game. We have no real understanding of what would enable players to
coordinate on a Nash eyuilibríum. ln fact, the most compelling argument in favor of Nash
equilibrium is itsclf based on the possibility of communication, which leads to a vicious circularity.
In discussing cummunication as a feature of games in general, an evulutionary, trial-and-error
approach nut based on the assumption of coordination seems potentially more convincing.
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